INTRODUCTION
Contests are an important fact of economic life. When firms bid for a defense contract, when scientists expend research effort to secure a patent, when lobbyists make contributions to gain political influence, and when politicians campaign for votes, the situation is one in which contestants make sunk investments in pursuit of a prize. An important element of each case is the rule by which the prize is allocated. The literature has largely taken a reduced-form approach by assuming the form of the success function that determines the probability that a contestant wins the prize.
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Two families of success functions have been studied frequently.
2 One comes from the so-called Tullock rent-seeking game in which a contestant's winning probability is proportional to a function of his ''effort.'' Specifically, contestant i's probability of winning the prize is when contestants j s 1, . . . , N expend effort e G 0. Thus, a contestant's j probability of winning depends on the ratio of effort levels. This success Ž . Ž . function has been studied by Tullock 1980 , Baye et al. 1993 , 1994 , 1996 , Ž . and Che and Gale 1997 , 1998 , among others. In the polar case of R s ϱ, the success function of the Tullock game coincides with that of the all-pay auction: the contestant who expends the greatest effort wins the prize with probability one.
Despite its apparent flexibility, this success function has drawbacks. Ž . First, while some cases 0 F R F 2, and R s ϱ are well understood, the intermediate cases are not.
3 Thus, the model offers no prediction of how rent-seeking activity will change as the sensitivity of the success function changes. In particular, it is not known whether the qualitative features of the equilibrium when R s 2 and R s ϱ are preserved when R is perturbed slightly. Second, even for the cases that have been analyzed, the qualitative properties of the equilibrium change as one shifts from 0 F R F 2 to R s ϱ. In the former cases, an increased asymmetry in bidders' valuations does not lower the amount of rent dissipation, given moderate levels of asymmetry, whereas the all-pay auction always displays such a ''preemption effect. '' In another family of success functions, called ''difference-form'' success ŽÄ Ž . functions, contestant i's probability of winning is given by f g e y i Ž .4 . Ž.
Ž. g e
, where f и and g и are increasing functions. The difference-form
success function is appropriate in many contexts. For example, in many contests the prize is allocated according to an absolute criterion based on each contestant's performance measure. A worker may be promoted Ž when his overall performance measure exceeds his peers' even by a slim . margin , and a politician wins an election when receiving just a single vote more. If each contestant's performance measure reflects his effort level exactly, then the all-pay auction is an appropriate model. In many cases, however, the performance measure may be an imperfect signal of the 2 Ž . See Skaperdas 1996 for additional references and discussion. 3 Ž . See Baye et al. 1994 . They studied the intermediate cases, characterizing symmetric equilibria when two bidders with identical valuations select from a discrete set of bids, and they calculated an upper bound on total expected rent dissipation. underlying variable of interest. For instance, a less able worker might achieve a better performance measure because of random events unrelated to effort.
Support that there are two contestants. Contestant i's performance measure, s , is given by his effort, e , garbled by an additive shock, ⑀ . That
is, for i s 1, 2, s s e q ⑀ ,
where ⑀ is a random variable. Contestant i wins the prize if
Ž. which occurs with probability f e y e , where f и is the cumulative i j distribution function of ⑀ y ⑀ . That is, the success function is of the j i difference form. As the noise disappears and the performance measures become perfectly precise, the difference-form success function approaches w Ž .
x that of the all-pay auction i.e., f и jumps from 0 to 1 at e y e s 0 . This
shows that the all-pay auction is a difference-form contest, too. Ž . Hirshleifer 1989 studied difference-form contests with two contestants, obtaining results that are dramatically different from those of the Tullock game. 4 For instance, in any pure-strategy equilibrium, one or both contes-Ž . tants expend zero effort. Baik 1997 studied a more general differenceform success function, showing that this property holds in all pure-strategy equilibria. By contrast, zero effort does not arise in the Tullock game when Ž . a pure-strategy equilibrium exists i.e., when 0 F R F 2 .
The previous work on general difference-form contests was limited to settings in which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which means that at Ž least one contestant is sufficiently insensitive to the outcome has a . sufficiently low valuation that he expends zero effort. So, when one contestant expends zero effort, it is unclear whether this passivity is a result of the restriction to pure-strategy equilibria. The restriction to pure-strategy equilibria also meant that these papers did not treat cases close to the important case of the all-pay auction, so they could not address the robustness issue.
The current paper analyzes a class of difference-form contests without the restriction to pure-strategy equilibria. While our primary focus is on the cases in which both contestants are viable, we characterize equilibria for all parameter values. For much of this paper, we restrict attention to a piecewise-linear success function, f e y e s max min 1r2 q s e y e , 1 , 0 ,
Ž . In particular, a logistic success function was studied. Skaperdas 1996 provided an axiomatic basis for the logistic success function. Neither the all-pay auction nor the contests we consider in Section 3 satisfy the axioms completely.
FIG. 1. Piecewise linear success function.
where s ) 0. Thus, a contestant's probability of winning the prize increases Ž . at the rate s, until the probability reaches one. See Fig. 1 . This success function turns out to be very flexible. At one extreme, when s s 0, the outcome is completely insensitive to effort. At the other extreme, when s s ϱ, the contest coincides with the all-pay auction, which is infinitely sensitive at the margin. For 0 -s -ϱ, a bidder can only guarantee Ž . success by exerting at least 1r 2 s more effort than his opponent.
Our success function proves to be more satisfying than the Tullock success function in the two dimensions noted above. First, it permits characterization of equilibrium for all possible valuations, and for all values of s. In the next section, we determine when pure-strategy equilibria fail to exist. Section 3 identifies two types of mixed-strategy equilibrium in that latter region. In these equilibria, the contestants place probability mass on a collection of isolated points. We are then able to show that the equilibrium converges to that of the all-pay auction as s goes to infinity Ž . Section 5 . This result shows that the all-pay auction is robust to randomness in how the prize is allocated, and to noise in the performance measure. Second, certain qualitative features of the equilibrium are preserved for all values of the sensitivity parameter. Of greatest interest is the preemption effectᎏthe property that an increased asymmetry in bidders' valuations leads to reduced rent dissipation. Section 4 shows that this effect persists for a broad set of parameter values, confirming that preemp-Ž tion is a general feature of difference-form contests not just all-pay . auctions .
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We first establish some basic results about contests with a differenceform success function. In keeping with much of the existing literature, we refer to the contestants as ''bidders'' and to their effort levels as ''bids.'' The first result establishes that at least one bidder bids zero in any pure-strategy equilibrium, for a very general family of difference-form Ž . Ž . success functions. While Hirshleifer 1989 and Baik 1997 showed this for certain twice-differentiable success functions, we need a more general version of their result.
Ž . Let f x y y be a general success function, which represents the probability that bidder 1 wins the prize when he expends x G 0 and bidder 2 Ž . expends y G 0 both measured in monetary units . Bidders 1 and 2 value Ž . the prize at¨and¨again measured in monetary units , respectively. The bidders are risk neutral, and they bid simultaneously. expected payoff functions can be locally linear with a slope of zero, so at least one bidder would strictly benefit from changing his bid. If¨s¨, 1 2 then Assumption 1 implies that neither bidder has an expected payoff function that is locally linear with a slope of zero. Thus, in either case, at least one bidder has an incentive to deviate. Q.E.D.
Equilibria in contest games with difference-form success functions are often in mixed strategies. Since it is a daunting task to characterize mixed-strategy equilibria for asymmetric bidders and a completely general Ž . success function, we focus on the aforementioned function, f x y y s Ä Ä Ž . 4 4 max min 1r2 q s x y y , 1 , 0 . Given our success function, the above proposition tells us when pure-strategy equilibria exist. From here on, we assume¨G¨, without loss of generality. equilibrium in which bidder 2 bids zero.
Proof. Start with the case of¨s ) 1, and suppose that a pure-strategy 2 equilibrium exists. Proposition 1 indicates that some bidder, say bidder i, bids zero. Bidder j / i then bids his best response, 1r2 s. Since bidder j wins the prize with probability one, bidder i will receive a payoff of zero in equilibrium. Consider a deviation by bidder i to a bid of 1rs. With the Ž latter bid, bidder i wins the prize with probability one against the bid of . 1r2 s by bidder j . The payoff from deviating is therefore¨y 1rs ) 0, i since¨s ) 1 for i s 1, 2. Since we have found a contradiction, a purei strategy equilibrium does not exist when¨s ) 1. is nonincreasing in y. 5 Thus, zero is a weakly dominant bid if¨s F 1.
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Bidder 1 optimizes against a bid of zero by bidding zero himself if¨s F 1, 1 or by bidding 1r2 s if¨s ) 1. These pure-strategy equilibria are unique 1 except in the nongeneric case that at least one of the valuations satisfies s s 1. Q.E.D.
i A pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist unless at least one bidder is Ž . sufficiently weak i.e., has a sufficiently low valuation . Thus, the more interesting cases in which both bidders are viable are ruled out when one focuses on pure-strategy equilibria. From here on, we assume that¨G 1 ) 1rs, so the equilibria will be in mixed strategies. 
ANALYSIS OF MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
In this section we characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria. We find two types of mixed-strategy equilibrium. In the ''overlapping'' type, the 5 The slope of the payoff function with respect to y takes on values of¨s y 1 F 0 or y1. 2 bidders put mass on zero, and on additional points whose locations depend on their respective valuations. It arises when the valuations are sufficiently close to each other andror s is sufficiently small. Otherwise, a ''staggered'' equilibrium exists. In it, the bidders put mass on evenly staggered points, with bidder 2 alone putting mass on zero. We also show that these Ž . equilibria are mutually exclusive generically and exhaustive in the region with mixed-strategy equilibria.
A. O¨erlapping Equilibrium
We first examine the overlapping equilibrium. Consider the following strategies. Bidder 1 assigns mass of m , . . . , m to bids x , . . . , x , for some
2 s s 2 s s
s Then, once we pin down x and y , we will have pinned down the closest to y. The payoff to bidder 1 from bidding x G 0, when bidder 2 employs the suggested strategy, is as follows:
Adjacent mass points are 1rs units apart, except for the first two, which
That is, only one of bidder 2's mass points would affect bidder 1's payoff if he were to change his bid slightly.
When bidder 1 follows the suggested strategy, bidder 2's expected payoff from bidding y G 0 is
½ 5
Several conditions are necessary for these to be equilibrium strategies. We now use some of these conditions to pin down when this type of equilibrium exists. First, bidder 1 must attain local maxima at x , . . . , x .
The assumption that x s 0 means that bidder 1's expected payoff must 1 not rise as he raises his bid from zero, which implies
Since bidder 2's mass must sum to one, we have k y 1 n s 1 y . 4
Ž .
1¨s 1 Ž . Ž . Combining 3 with 4 , and using the fact that n G 0, yields 1 s F k F¨s q 1. 5
1 1
Repeating the exercise for bidder 2 pins down m , . . . , m , and it yields 1 k the additional necessary condition:
Ž . This type of equilibrium only exists if both 5 and 6 hold:
Imposing indifference between x and x for bidder 1, and between y Ž . of all other mass points, via 1 .
Ž . Ž Generically, at most one integer, k G 2, satisfies 7 . Recall that we . Ž. assume¨s ) 1 here. Note that 7 is only possible if¨s q 1 G¨s,
6 Generically, there exists a continuum of equilibria that are payoff equivalent to the Ž . overlapping equilibrium. See Che and Gale 1998 for details.
Ž .
Ž
x Ž . 1r2 s . Since n s 1r¨s, for i s 2, . . . , k, by 2 , we have n q n G 1r¨s,
Ž . w x which implies that U x is increasing in x for x g y y 1r2 s, 1r2 s . 
and y F x q 1r2 s, which holds since
Ž . where the inequality follows from 7 . The expected payoff to each bidder is graphed in Fig. 2 , which shows that neither bidder can benefit strictly by deviating from the putative equilibrium strategies. Q.E.D. Ž In this overlapping equilibrium, bidder 2 places mass on higher bids i.e., . x F y , i s 2, . . . , k but places less mass on each non-zero mass point Proof. The first statement is obtained by straightforward computation.
Ž . The second statement holds since, by 7 , the total expected rent dissipation satisfies
The inequality is strict, generically. Q.E.D.
It is instructive to examine the expected surplus accruing to each bidder. Proposition 3 shows that each bidder places strictly positive mass on zero when s is finite. This implies that each bidder can receive a strictly positive Ž . expected surplus by bidding zero, which implies the following: COROLLARY 2. In the o¨erlapping equilibrium presented in Proposition 3, each bidder recei¨es strictly positi¨e expected surplus if s -ϱ.
An important special case of the overlapping equilibrium involves Ž . symmetric values. Suppose that¨s¨'¨. Then, 7 reduces to¨s F k F 1 2 s q 1, and the equilibrium is symmetric. We summarize the result. To illustrate this equilibrium, suppose that 1 -¨s -2. Each bidder Ž . places probability mass of¨s y 1 r¨s and 1r¨s on 0 and¨r2, respectively.
B. Staggered Equilibrium
The previous section concerned the case in which¨and¨were close 1 2 to each other. We now treat the complementary case. As before, suppose that bidder 1 puts probability mass m , . . . , m on x , . . . , x , and bidder 2 1 k 1 k puts mass n , . . . , n on y , . . . , y , for some integer, k G 2. Now, the mass 1 k 1 k points are staggered in the following way:
, and x y x s y y y s , for i s 2, . . . , k.
For a given bidder, the mass points are spaced 1rs units apart. This mixed-strategy profile is sketched in Fig. 3 for k s 3. Ž . < < Ž . As before, let i x g argmin x y y for any x G 0, and let j y g j j < < argmin y y x , for any y G 0. Then, the expected payoff to bidder 1 from i i bidding x G 0, when bidder 2 follows the suggested strategy, is
Likewise, when bidder 1 follows the suggested strategy, bidder 2's expected payoff from bidding y G 0 is
The first necessary condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that bidder 1 must attain local maxima at x , . . . , x . For x -x , this requires
Ž . Recall that y is bidder 2's closest mass point to x, and x s y q 1r2 s.
The latter condition implies that The equilibrium is characterized as follows.
Ž . satisfies 13 and 15 , n satisfies 11 and 10 , and x and y satisfy 8 . Proof. Bidder 2 puts mass on zero. Such a bid loses for sure, since the Ž . infimum of bidder 1's bids is x s 1r 2 s . This implies that the equilib-1 rium expected surplus for bidder 2 is zero. Since bidder 2 places mass on zero, bidder 1 must receive a strictly positive expected surplus. Q.E.D.
This result is commonly observed in contest models such as the all-pay Ž . auction and the modified war-of-attrition game see Riley, 1998 in which the bidder with the higher valuation can profitably preempt this opponent. It is noteworthy that the same result holds here, even though preemption is more difficult.
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C. Existence of an Equilibrium
We now establish existence of equilibrium for the general case in whicḧ ) 1rs. In the all-pay auction, the bidder with the higher valuation need only bid more than the lower valuation to guarantee a win. Here, by contrast, ensuring a win requires outbiding by at least 1r2 s. Note that this preemption result may hold here even when the bidders are almost w x symmetric, provided that¨s,¨s contains an integer. which contains an integer. We now show that there cannot be both types w x of equilibrium, generically. Note first that¨s,¨s q 1 is empty if¨s ) 1 2 1 s q 1, so suppose that¨s F¨s q 1. In that case, the intersection of 2 1 2 the two regions is w x w ẍ s,¨s q 1 l¨s,¨s s¨s.
Thus, both types of equilibrium can exist only if k s¨s for some integer 1 k, which is a nongeneric case. Q.E.D.
PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
We can now study how the equilibrium varies as parameter values change. This will enable us to show that increases in the higher valuation cause total expected rent dissipation to fall, meaning that preemption is a general feature. The all-pay auction provides a useful benchmark. Total Ž . expected rent dissipation from the all-pay auction is 1 q¨r¨¨r2, 2 1 2 which falls as the valuations become more asymmetric. As the high-valuation bidder's valuation rises, the low-valuation bidder becomes more pessimistic about his prospect of winning and becomes less aggressive, which enables the high-valuation bidder to win with a relatively lower bid Ž . on average .
Ž . Assume that a staggered equilibrium exists, with k G 2 satisfying 17 . Straightforward calculations yield the total expected rent dissipation:
Ž . Suppose that¨rises. Then, the original value of k still satisfies 17 . The 1 effect on bidder 2's strategy is that n , . . . , n fall, and n rises. This means Ž . original k no longer satisfies 17 , then rent dissipation falls discretely. To Ž . see this last point, consider the transition value,¨s k y 1 s, at which 2 we go from a staggered equilibrium with k mass points to one with k y 1. The change in rent dissipation is
These observations imply that total expected rent dissipation falls as¨1 rises andror¨falls. Thus, preemption is a robust feature of the differ-2 ence-form contest, not just a special feature of the all-pay auction. It is noteworthy that preemption occurs when s -ϱ even though the bidder with the higher valuation cannot guarantee a win as easily as when s s ϱ.
The results are different for the overlapping equilibrium. Suppose that Ž . Ž . an integer k G 2 satisfies 7 . As¨rises or¨falls, 7 becomes more 1 2 Ž . onerous: either the same k continues to satisfy 7 or no integer satisfies it, in which case there is a staggered equilibrium.
As¨rises from¨s¨, the equilibrium remains in the overlapping 1 1 2 regime initially. Consider changes in the parameter values that are suffi-Ž . ciently small that the original k continues to satisfy 7 . We know from the previous section that the expected payment from each bidder does not vary with¨or¨, for fixed k. Hence, total expected rent dissipation is 
ROBUSTNESS OF THE ALL-PAY AUCTION
We now study the limiting behavior as the sensitivity of the success function approaches s s ϱ, which is the case of the all-pay auction. In particular, we show that the cumulative distribution function of equilibrium bids converges uniformly to that under the all-pay auction, which implies that the all-pay auction is robust to randomness in how the prize is allocated. In doing so, we must distinguish the cases of symmetric and asymmetric valuations: the overlapping equilibrium holds in the former case and the staggered equilibrium holds in the latter, for sufficiently large s. We begin with the symmetric case.
A. Symmetric Valuations
Ž .
Let¨s¨'¨. There exists an integer, k G 2, that satisfies 7 , pro-1 2 vided that¨s G 1. Then, an overlapping equilibrium of the form described Ž . in Proposition 3 exists. Fix any s ) 1r¨, and let k s denote the corre-Ž . sponding value of k that satisfies 7 . The cumulative distribution function Ž . Ä 4 of equilibrium bids, F x ' Prob i's bid is no greater than x , is given by
In the all-pay auction, the cumulative distribution function of equilibrium bids is Ä 4 Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1993 . The following proposition establishes the convergence result.
Ž . Ž . PROPOSITION 8. F и con¨erges uniformly to F и as s goes to ϱ.
Ž . where F x denotes the left-hand limit of F и at x . We show that the
right-hand side of the above equation approaches zero as s tends to ϱ. Observe that Again, uniform convergence implies convergence in the mean.
COROLLARY 6. Gi¨en asymmetric¨aluations, the expected payment by each bidder approaches that under the all-pay auction, as s approaches ϱ.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed contests in which a contestant's probability of winning the prize depends on the difference between his effort and his rival's. Our model has advantages over the previous work in this area. First, it allows different levels of sensitivity of the success function to contestants' efforts, with the lottery and all-pay auction as special cases, and it permits characterization of equilibrium for all possible values of the sensitivity parameter. Previous work on difference-form contests and all-pay auctions largely treated extreme cases in which the outcome of the contest was infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to effort levels, or at least one agent had a low valuation of the prize. This limited scope had left unclear whether the earlier findings were a direct result of parameter restrictions. Our complete characterization fills a gap in the understanding of contests. Second, our model allows us to check whether properties of contest games such as the all-pay auction are robust. We demonstrated the robustness of the limiting cases by showing that the equilibrium of our difference-form contest converges to that of the all-pay auction, as s approaches infinity.
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Finally, we showed that the main qualitative features of the equilibrium are very general. In particular, the amount of rent dissipation falls as the gap between the bidders' valuations increases, over a large parameter region. This result buttresses the assessment that asymmetries among bidders are key to explaining why real-world contests appear to display Ž . significant underdissipation see Riley, 1998 . While previous work had Ž shown that preemption occurs in the all-pay auction Hillman and Riley, . 1989; Baye et al., 1993 , our results indicate that such ''preemption-induced underdissipation'' is a general feature of difference-form contests, not just all-pay auctions.
Our model is a step toward building a general theory of contests, but more work is needed in two directions. First, we have focused on a particular class of difference-form success functions. It is important to know whether the main results extend to more general classes of difference-form success functions. Second, it is important to know whether there are other equilibria, and, if so, whether the main results of this paper are preserved.
